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The Alternative Minimum Tax: 
Proving Again That Two Wrongs 
Do Not Make a Right 
Glenn E. Covent 
A major objective of recent tax reform movements has been to 
curtail the excessive claiming of tax incentive deductions and exclu-
sions by high income individual taxpayers. This attack on "tax prefer-
ences, is important not only because it would improve the tax system's 
overall equity, but also because it helps to ensure the viability of our 
self-assessment reporting system. This system of tax collection is 
threatened by the popular perception that the tax laws are unduly 
favorable to the rich. 1 Thus, the imposition of effective restrictions on 
tax reduction techniques available only to high income taxpayers could 
produce the significant secondary benefit of increased taxpayer compli-
ance. 
The attack on preferences, however, was marked by considerable 
uncertainty of both goal and method. Several widely differing ap-
proaches were advanced and those adopted have been amended fre-
quently. Regrettably, the enacted limitations have been among the 
least rational and least effective of those proposed. The alternative 
minimum tax,2 added to the Internal Revenue Code3 (Code) at the end 
of 1978,4 is the most recent revision in the attack on preferences. Al-
though the present alternative tax was designed to affect only two pref-
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Professor of Law, University of 
Tennessee. B.A. 1963, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1966, Columbia University. 
1. See Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base, in House 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 77, 82 (1959); Roberts, Friedman, 
Ginsburg, Louthan, Lubick, Young & Zeitlin, A Repon on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 
TAX. L. REV. 325, 328 (1972). 
2. I.R.C. § 55. 
3. All references to sections are to sections of the Code unless otherwise specified. 
4. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 42l(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). 
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erence items, in time the alternative tax may become the principal 
mechanism for restricting the concentration of tax preferences. 5 
That evolution would be highly unfortunate. Analysis of the alter-
native tax demonstrates that it is ill-conceived in every respect. The 
results reached by application of the alternative tax provisions are ei-
ther inherently inequitable or involve unduly circuitous and cumber-
some calculations. Congress should promptly repeal the tax, and attack 
the excessive claiming of preferences within the traditional taxing sys-
tem. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Our income tax laws are required to perform two inconsistent 
tasks. While the Code's primary function is to allocate the costs of gov-
ernment equitably over the entire population, a major portion of the 
law is designed to implement a wide variety of social objectives 
through the use of tax incentives to persons undertaking specified de-
sired activities. Such incentives in the form of tax relief reduce the allo-
cable tax burden of responding taxpayers below the level which would 
be imposed were equitable considerations alone determinative. 
By 1969 it had become apparent that some taxpayers were availing 
themselves of these tax concessions to such an extent that their other-
wise substantial tax liabilities were reduced to unacceptably low levels.6 
To a limited degree, Congress responded to this use of preferences by 
curtailing the tax incentives extended by certain Code sections.7 That 
approach alone, however, could not eliminate the perceived abuses 
without substantially eliminating the very incentives that Congress 
wished to extend. Accordingly, a mechanism was sought that would 
permit the continued use of tax incentives but would prevent individual 
taxpayers from aggregating these tax concessions to excessively reduce 
their tax liabilities. 
A seemingly obvious reconciliation of the conflicting objectives of 
greater equity and continued preference would be to limit the propor-
tion of a taxpayer's income that might be sheltered by tax concessions. 
5. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 263-68, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEws 7198, 7259-65. 
6. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. I, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEws 1645, 1652-56. 
7. The 1969 legislation, for example, added I.R.C. § 1251, requiring the recapture of excess 
farm losses, and l.R.C. § 163(d), limiting the deductibility of excess investment interest. Tax Re-
form Act ofl969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 2ll(a), 22l(a), 83 Stat. 488 (1969). The process of gradu-
ally tightening specific preferences has continued to the present. See, e.g., Foreign Earned Income 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-615, §§ 201-207, 92 Stat. 3097 (amending and adding I.R.C. §§ 911-
913). 
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The House of Representatives has twice passed proposals to impose 
such limitations.8 Under a 1969 proposal, for example, a taxpayer 
would have been barred from claiming the tax benefit otherwise attrib-
utable to certain preferences in excess of 50% of a calculation of income 
that was rather inaccurately characterized as "economic" or "total" in-
come9-adjusted gross income plus the amounts of those preferences. 
These measures were ultimately rejected by Congress, however, in 
favor of a penalty approach that operated essentially outside of the ex-
isting taxing framework, the "minimum" tax, coupled with a new tax 
incentive available to taxpayers willing to forego the other preferences, 
the so-called "maximum" tax. 
A. The Maximum Tax and The Minimum Tax 
The maximum tax limited the marginal rate of taxation on earned 
income to 50%. 10 The express purpose of the ceiling rate was to reduce 
the incentive for high earned-income taxpayers to claim preferences. 11 
In keeping with this goal, the ceiling was not applicable to an amount 
of income equal to the sum of the tax preferences nevertheless claimed 
by the taxpayer. 12 Thus, taxpayers not responding to the inducements 
of the maximum tax are penalized by the reinstatement of the normal 
70% maximum rate. 13 
The minimum (or "preference") tax was a 10% excise tax imposed 
upon the sum of a specified list of tax preferences in excess of a rela-
8. H.R. 13270, 9lst Cong., lst Sess. § 30l(a)(l) (1969); H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 
§ J:Ol(a) (1975). The latter measure would have imposed a "limitation on artificial losses" (LAL) 
by barring the deduction of certaiu preferential allowances in excess of taxable income, computed 
after reduction by all other allowances, from the activity in which the preference was claimed. In 
other words, the LAL was designed to prohibit the reduction of unrelated income with preferences 
generated in tax sheltering activities. 
9. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. I, 9lst Cong., lst Sess. 8-9, 77-78, reprinted in [1969] U.S. 
CONG. & Ao. NEws 1645, 1652-54, 1723-25. See note 35 infta. 
The House bill would have further penalized the claiming of preferential allowances by re-
quiring that the amount of certain itemized deductions be allocated between taxable and nontax-
able income. To the extent the deduction was allocable to the latter, it was to be denied. H.R. 
13270, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1969). The rejection of this measure was entirely correct. 
The propriety of limiting a taxpayer's ability to claim tax incentive allowances as a function of the 
level of his nonpreferential, and perhaps involuntary, expenses, such as his medical expenses, is 
highly dubious. The two items are simply uurelated. lt would appear clearly irrational to extend 
a larger capital gains exclusion to a healthy man than to a sick one. 
10. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 804(a), 83 Stat. 488 (1969) (adding l.R.C. 
§ 1348). 
11. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. I, 9lst Cong., lst Sess. 208, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1645, 1863-64. 
12. I.R.C. § 1348(b)(2)(B). 
13. For criticism of the maximum tax, see Levy, The Maximum Tax on Earned Income: An 
Inefficient and Inequitable Tax Shelter Deterrent, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 883 (1978). 
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tively generous exemption. 14 Because the Senate, which proposed the 
preference tax, was willing to penalize only the most extreme concen-
trations of tax incentives, the sum of the preferences subject to tax was 
reduced by $30,000 plus the amount of regular income tax paid for the 
year. The resulting penalty was almost completely ineffectual. 15 In 
1976, however, the tax was strengthened by an increase in the rate of 
tax to 15% and by a reduction of the exemption to the greater of 
$10,000 or one-half of the regular tax paid. 16 
The preference tax contained, and continues to contain, several 
highly unsatisfactory, if not plainly inequitable, features. The tax im-
posed an equal penalty on all preferences regardless of the magnitude 
of distortion of income they produced. Thus the relatively slight pref-
erence produced by the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-
line depreciation on property having a short useful life was subjected to 
the same penalty as the permanent exclusion from income (then) of 
50% of capital gains. As a result, the preference tax in effect imposed a 
relatively substantial penalty on the less preferential allowances17 but a 
virtually insignificant penalty on the most preferential. 
Furthermore, the incidence of tax was regressive relative to in-
come before reduction by preferences. Because of the progressivity of 
the regular income tax rate schedule, as a taxpayer's income rose, his 
regular exemption from taxable preferences for taxes paid rose more 
rapidly. Thus, for taxpayers sheltering an equal proportion of their 
otherwise taxable incomes with preferences, the effect of the preference 
tax declines as income rises. 
The reduction of the exemption to one-half of the regular income 
tax would have reduced this regressivity. However, the 1976 amend-
ment to the preference tax coupled the reduction with the elimination 
of the fixed dollar exemption, which had somewhat offset the regressiv-
ity of the tax. While the combined effect of these amendments signifi-
cantly increased the penalty imposed at all levels, the greatest increase 
occurred at the lower income levels, thus actually increasing the regres-
sive character of the tax. 18 
14. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 30I(a), 83 Stat. 488 (1969) (adding I.R.C. 
§§56-58). 
15. S. ReP. No. 94-938, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in (1976] U.S. Cooe CoNo. 
& Ao. News 3439, 3544-45. 
16. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L: No. 94-455, § 30l(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (amending 
l.R.C. § 56(a)). 
17. See Brogden & Fisher, Accelerated Depreciation v. the Minimum Tax, 56 TAXES 530,530-
34. 
18. The incidence of the preference tax both before and after the 1976 amendments can be 
seen from the following table. The table shows, at different levels of taxable income computed 
before reduction by preference items (theoretical taxable income), the effect of the application of 
the preference tax when varying proportions of theoretical taxable income are sheltered by prefer-
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B. The Alternative Minimum Tax 
The paths of reform are rarely straight. By 1978 the congressional 
priorities were "capital formation" and "energy." It was clear that the 
pendulum had swung back to u~ing the Code to implement social pol-
icy19 and away from efforts to improve its equitable impact. The alter-
native minimum tax was the product of a congressional desire to 
reduce the penalty upon the claiming of tax preferences, particularly 
upon the long-established capital gains exclusion-which Congress si-
multaneously raised to 60% from the long-standing 50%.2° 
From every perspective, the Code would have benefited if capital 
gains had merely been exempted from the existing preference tax. In-
stead, Congress took an intermediate step that added little but irra-
tional complexity to the tax laws. While one might have thought that a 
highly complex tax law supplemented by an additional layer of prefer-
ence tax would be enough tax law for any single nation, Congress 
ences. The effect of the tax is shown as the taxable income (expressed as a percentage of theoreti-
cal taxable income) which would produce a regular income tax equal to the tax actually produced 
by the regular tax plus the preference tax. 
TAXABLE INCOME EQUIVALENT PRODUCED BY 
1969 AND 1976 PREFERENCE TAX RATES 
Theoretical 
Taxable 
Income 
$ 100,000 
200,000 
500,000 
1,000,000 
Taxable Income as a Percent of 
Theoretical Taxable Income 
50% 25% 
1969 1976 1969 1976 
51 61 35 47 
52 59 35 44 
52 57 34 40 
52 57 33 39 
Proportion 
Left 
0% Unsheltered 
1969 1976 
28 43 
25 36 
21 29 
18 25 
For example, if a taxpayer having a theoretical taxable income of$100,000 claimed preferences in 
the amount of $75,000, he would reduce his taxable income to 25% of his theoretical taxable 
income. After the 1976 amendment, the resulting preference tax, when added to the regular tax 
payable on a taxable income of $25,000, produces the same amount as would the regular income 
tax alone on a taxable income of approximately $47,000. Thus, it may be said that the effect of the 
preference tax is to restore this taxpayer's taxable income from 25% to 47% of his theoretical 
taxable income. By contrast, were his income $1 million, the restoration would be from only 25% 
to 39%. 
19. The Carter Administration had proposed not only to facilitate capital formation prima-
rily through a reduction in the tax rates, but also to strengthen the limitations on tax incentives. 
U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENTS 1978 TAX BUDGET (1978). Congress accepted the general 
tax reduction, added a reduction in the tax rate on capital gains, and materially weakened the 
limitations on tax preferences. See text accompanying notes 20-21 i'!(ra. In addition, Congress 
enacted the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174, that, among other things, 
added a series of inconsequential but highly preferential credits to the law. I.R.C. § 44C. The 
following year I.R.C. § 44C was expanded, thereby becoming less inconsequential but no less 
preferential. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 202, 94 Stat. 258. 
20. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). Surprisingly, 
the Senate had proposed increasing the exclusion to 70%. H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 402(a) (1978). -" 
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thought otherwise. The capital gains preference was deleted from the 
preference tax and a new tax apparently directed at capital gains was 
adoptedY 
Unlike the older "add-on" or excise type preference tax, the new 
tax is a largely independent income tax having its own tax base and 
rate schedules. Taxpayers are subject to the greater of the tax produced 
by the regular income tax, increased by the add-on preference tax, or 
the tax produced by this new "alternative" tax.22 True to its concep-
tion, the alternative tax will affect few taxpayers in more than a rela-
tively minor way. However, those unfortunate few will find themselves 
subject to a most complex and peculiar system of taxation. 
The base upon which the alternative tax is computed, "alternative 
minimum taxable income," consists of the sum of (a) gross income re-
duced by all allowable deductions,23 plus (b) the two preferences attrib-
utable to capital gains and itemized deductions.24 The first component 
of the tax base is classical taxable income, that is, taxable income com-
puted without regard to the nondeductibility of itemized deductions to 
the extent they do not exceed the zero bracket amount-25 However, the 
21. I.R.C. § 55 is entitled the "alternative minimum tax" presumably to distinguish it from 
the minimum tax for tax preferences imposed by I.R.C. § 56. The new tax is referred to herein as 
the alternative tax. 
22. Technically I.R.C. § 55 imposes a tax in addition to the regular tax and the preference 
tax equal to the excess of the alternative tax, if any, over the sum of the other two. I.R.C. § 55(a). 
23. In order to avoid a double tax benefit, I.R.C. § 55(b)(l) (fiush language) bars the reduc-
tion of the alternative tax base with deductions that may be carried over in reduction of the regu-
lar tax in another year. See S. REP. No. 96-498, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69, reprinted in [1980) 
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 914, 975-77. 
24. I.R.C. § 55(b)(l). The resulting base is further reduced by two amounts. Presumably in 
an effort to impede the manipulation of income and regular tax, the amount of any accumulation 
distribution from a trust included in income under I.R.C. § 667 and the tax attributable to such a 
distribution are excluded from the computation of the tax base and the regular tax, respectively. 
I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(l)(B) and 55(b)(2). 
Secondly, the amount of any alcohol fuel credit included in income under l.R.C. § 86 is 
similarly excluded from the alternative tax base. I.R.C. § 55(b)(l)(B). The Crude Oil Windfall 
Profits Tax Act of 1980 added a tax credit to the Code which was related to the quantity of alcohol 
used in the production of fuel. Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 232(b)(l), 94 Stat. 258 (adding I.R.C. § 44E). 
Congress desired, however, to concentrate this new subsidy of the production of gasohol on lower 
income taxpayers. In order to create a tax credit the benefits of which declined as income rose, a 
new I.R.C. § 86 was added to require an amount equal to the allowable § 44E credit to be in-
cluded in income. As a net result, a taxpayer will lose a fraction of the § 44E credit equal to his 
highest marginal tax rate. In common with most credits, the § 44E credit may not be taken against 
the alternative tax. See text accompanying note 67 i'!fra. Since the inclusion of the credit in 
income under I.R.C. § 86 is simply a technique for reducing the subsidy extended by I.R.C. § 44E, 
that inclusion is quite properly ignored in the computation of the alternative tax base. 
25. If the zero bracket amount is greater than the sum of the taxpayer's itemized deductions, 
the entire zero bracket amount is treated as a deduction for alternative tax base purposes. Techni-
cal Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 104(a)(4)(D), 94 Stat. 194. 
The introduction of that allowance into the alternative tax erodes the integrity of that tax in 
precisely the same manner as the erosion of the integrity of the regular tax computation that 
produced the need for the alternative tax. Thus the process begins and in time, perhaps, a second 
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computation permissibly may produce a negative amount-26 
The two preference inclusions are the untaxed portion of capital 
gains and "adjusted itemized deductions.'m This second preference, 
an adaptation of the "excess itemized deduction" preference that had 
been included in the preference tax, consists of all itemized deductions 
other than (1) those allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income, pri-
marily deductions incurred in the conduct of a trade or business;28 (2) 
the deduction for personal exemptions; and (3) four specific exceptions 
which are referred to herein as the "favored deductions.'' The favored 
deductions include those for medical expenses; casualty losses; state, 
local, and foreign taxes; and the section 69l(c) deduction for estate 
taxes paid. 29 The remaining deductions become "adjusted" or included 
in the alternative tax base to the extent that in the aggregate they ex-
ceed 60% of adjusted gross income reduced by the four favored deduc-
tions. 
The resulting tax base is then subject to a tax which is derived 
from a rate schedule entirely separate from the regular tax rate.30 The 
alternative tax rate schedule roughly parallels the regular schedule in 
its progression, although it employs only four marginal brackets (in-
cluding a zero percent bracket), and its rates are far lower. After a 
relatively high exemption of $20,000, the minimum rate of 10% is im-
posed. The rate then leaps to 20% at $60,000, producing a sharp in-
crease in progressivity. Thereafter, however, the rate schedule remains 
almost fiat with the sole increase, of only 5%, occurring at $100,000 to 
produce the maximum rate of 25%. If the tax so produced exceeds the 
taxpayer's regular income tax liability, including any tax attributable to 
the preference tax, the amount of the excess becomes an additional tax 
payable. 
The relationship between the alternative tax and the various cred-
its provided under the Code is a complex one. Credits, of course, re-
duce regular tax liability, thus increasing the likelihood that an 
alternative tax will be payable. Certain credits, however, may in effect 
alternative tax will be enacted in response to the corruption of the first alternative tax base. lt 
would have been preferable for Congress to have permitted the reduction of the alternative tax 
base by all itemized deductions regardless of whether or not they exceeded the zero bracket 
amounl 
26. S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 204, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
Ao. NEWS 6761, 6967 [hereinafter cited as 1978 SENATE REPORT]. 
27. I.R.C. §57 (b). 
28. I.R.C. § 57(b)(l) includes "itemized deductions," which are defined in I.R.C. § 63(f) as 
deductions from adjusted gross income other than the personal exemption provided by I.R.C. 
§ 151. 
29. I.R.C. § 57(b)(l). Trusts and estates were allowed additional exclusions. I.R.C. 
§ 57(b)(2). 
30. I.R.C. § 55(a)(l). 
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be offset against the alternative tax although others may not.31 In all, 
credits are treated in four different ways and the resulting pattern is one 
of the least satisfactory aspects of this highly dubious measure. 
, The form of the alternative tax as it was ultimately enacted repre-
sented a substantial compromise between the House and Senate ver-
sions of how the preference tax should be modified.32 One result of the 
compromise reached in conference is that there is relatively little in the 
legislative history to indicate why the tax took the form it did or what 
the provision was intended to accomplish.33 From the perspective of 
the wavering history of tax reform, however, the alternative tax has 
received unprecedented support and for that reason could well become 
the model for future congressional efforts. Such support should be an 
incentive to assess the rationality of the alternative tax. 
II 
THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX IN OPERATION 
A. Capital Gains 
1. Mechanics 
A taxpayer who does not have adjusted itemized deductions has 
an alternative tax base of classical taxable income plus the amount of 
the capital gains exclusion. This concept of restoring taxable income 
by adding back the amount of excluded preferences to produce an 
amount more nearly resembling a theoretically accurate computation 
of income is related to the rejected 1969 House proposal that would 
have limited the ability to claim preferences to 50% of "economic" in-
come.35 Under the alternative tax, however, this restoration lacks the 
equitable significance it held under the 1969 proposal because there-
sulting tax base is subjected to the different alternative tax rate schedule 
rather than to the regular tax. Because different rate schedules are em-
ployed, the tax imposed under the alternative tax is not comparable, or 
even rationally related, to the regular tax. 
31. See text accompanying notes 65-69 infta. 
32. The House had proposed only that capital gains be eliminated from the existing prefer-
ence tax, H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(a)(l978), and subject to a new alternative tax at a 
flat rate of 10% on the untaxed portion of capital gains in excess of $10,000, id § 403(a). The 
Senate, on the other hand, proposed the entire repeal of the preference tax, id § 441, and its 
replacement with an alternative tax on the sum of all preference items under a progressive rate 
schedule, id § 42l(a). 
33. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 267-68, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7198, 7259-65. 
34. l.R.C. §§ 55(b)(l)(A), 55(b)(l)(C)(ii). 
35. See text accompanying note 9 supra. Both provisions, of course, are adaptations of the 
economist's notion of "expanded" income. For a recent attempt to refine that concept, see Okner, 
Distributional Aspects of Tax Reform During the Past Fifteen Years, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 11 (1979). 
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The alternative tax was designed to have only a minimal impact 
on the tax benefit of the capital gains exclusion alone. While that ob-
jective was largely achieved, to the extent that it was not the alternative 
tax is clearly inequitable. The impact of the tax on the receipt of un-
sheltered capital gains income can be demonstrated by supposing a tax-
payer who has allowable deductions in an amount exactly equal to the 
amount of his ordinary gross income. The taxable income of such a 
taxpayer can be said to consist solely of capital gains, plus the non-
deductible zero bracket amount. For such a taxpayer, with either rela-
tively small or very large capital gains, the alternative tax will not pro-
duce a tax in excess of the regular income tax. However, it will produce 
a tax penalty over a rather substantial intermediate range. 
An alternative tax penalty will not be incurred until the taxpayer 
has derived capital gains in excess of approximately $89,000.36 As ad-
ditional gains are received, both the regular tax and the alternative tax 
will increase. At this level of income, however, the alternative tax in-
creases at a faster rate. Thus, ifthe taxpayer derives $200,000 of capital 
gains, his regular tax will be $32,314 on income of $80,000 plus the 
$3,400 zero bracket amount. His alternative tax of $37,000, however, 
will exceed that amount by over $4,500. The absolute amount by 
which the alternative tax exceeds the regular tax remains roughly con-
stant until gains of about $450,000 are derived, and thereafter begins to 
decline. By the time the taxpayer has derived gains of about $1 million, 
the regular tax will again exceed the alternative tax. As the foregoing 
illustrates, the penalty imposed by alternative tax on the receipt of 
wholly unsheltered capital gains varies widely at different levels of in-
come and, at some levels, can be quite substantial. 37 
This variance can be quantified by viewing the tax as a reduction 
in the amount of the capital gains exclusion. So viewed, the effect of 
the tax on capital gains of $200,000 is the reduction of the exclusion 
from 60% to 56%.38 While the absolute size of the alternative tax pen-
alty imposed on larger gains remains relatively stable and then slowly 
declines, as a proportion of the capital gain itself it disappears far more 
rapidly. Thus, a taxpayer having a capital gain twice as great will have 
a taxable income of $163,400. The alternative tax of $87,000 on this 
income will exceed his regular tax of $82,144 by $4,856. However, a 
regular tax of $87,000 is payable on a classical taxable income of 
36. All illustrations herein of the effect of the alternative tax assume that the taxpayer files a 
joint return, claims four personal exemptions, and employs the tax rates in effect during 1980. 
37. The hypothetical taxpayer would have to have a classical taxable income of $88,129-
over 10% greater than the $80,000 of classical taxable income produced by a $200,000 capital 
gain-before a regular income tax of $37,000 would be assessed. 
38. That is, the tax actually paid is the same as the regular tax on approximately $88,000 or 
44% of the capital gain. 
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$167,141 or 41.8% of the capital gain. Thus the effective capital gains 
e~clusion has been reduced only to 58.2%. Thereafter, the absolute 
amount of the penalty declines sharply. On capital gains of $500,000, 
the effect of the tax is merely to reduce the exclusion by less than 1% to 
59.2%. 
2. Possible Rationales 
It is not entirely clear whether this uneven impact of the alterna-
tive tax on different levels of income was deliberate or is merely an 
unintended side-effect of the new tax. The only justification for delib-
erately so designing the alternative tax would be a determination by 
Congress that the combination of the rate of progression of the regular 
tax and the increased capital gains exclusion produced an inadequate 
tax on capital gains in the affected range. However, there is no indica-
tion in the Committee Reports that Congress so concluded-or even 
was aware of the uneven impact of the alternative tax.39 
Moreover, if the rate of progression is inadequate for taxpayers 
deriving solely capital gains income, it should be inadequate where the 
taxpayer also derives a small amount of ordinary income. The addi-
tional tax payable on the ordinary income should not alter the inade-
quacy of the tax paid with respect to the capital gain. However, the 
alternative tax penalty on capital gains is completely eliminated at all 
income levels if the taxpayer has small amounts of unsheltered ordi-
nary income. For example, if a taxpayer having $200,000 of capital 
gain also derived $14,000 of ordinary income in excess of his deduc-
tions, his regular tax would exceed his alternative tax. Thus, net ordi-
nary income equal to 7% of the capital gain would completely 
eliminate the reduction of the capital gains exemption. This effect of 
small additions of ordinary income holds true over the entire range of 
income.40 
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that this selective penalty on capital 
gains was deliberate. If the 60% exclusion was thought appropriate for 
capital gains below $89,000 and above $1 million, it must also be ap-
propriate at intermediate levels. 
Rather,. because the point at which the alternative tax penalty is 
incurred roughly parallels at all income levels the point at which ordi-
nary deductions exceed ordinary income and begin to offset capital 
gains, it appears that the drafters of the alternative tax sought generally 
to exempt capital gains as such from the alternative tax. Whether or 
39. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-24, reprinted in [1978] U.S, CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 7044, 7050-52 [hereinafter cited as 1978 HOUSE REPORT]; 1978 SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 26, at 200-07. 
40. See Seago, The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 1979 TAX ADVISER 324, 326-27. 
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not the tax was consciously designed to impose a penalty at such points, 
a decision to do so would have been logical and would have treated 
taxpayers at different income levels fairly.41 The failure of the existing 
alternative tax to impose a penalty at exactly thes~ points is a material 
defect in the tax. Indeed, to the extent that the alternative tax imposes 
a greater penalty on deriving solely capital gains income at some in-
come levels than it does at others, the tax is clearly inequitable. 
3. Inherency 
The primary reason for this uneven impact of the alternative tax is 
that the tax employs only four tax brackets. As a result, it is clearly 
impossible for the alternative tax, regardless of the rates employed, pre-
cisely to parallel the regular income tax. On the contrary, for an alter-
native tax to impose a penalty commencing at the same income 
configuration at every different level of income would require the alter-
native tax to contain the same number of brackets, with corresponding 
intervals, as the regular rate schedule. Obviously, achieving a compa-
rable result within the existing taxing system would be preferable to 
such total duplication. 
B. Capital Gains Offiet by .Deductions 
Just as increases in the amount of ordinary income in a taxpayer's 
return reduce, and quickly eliminate, the alternative tax, increases in 
the amount of deductions, whether from gross income or itemized, in 
excess of ordinary income will cause the alternative tax to exceed the 
regular tax. As deductions are increasingly applied against the taxable 
portion of capital gains, both the regular tax and the alternative tax are 
reduced. However, because of its lower rate, the alternative tax de-
clines more slowly than does the regular tax. Ultimately, the alterna-
tive tax applied to the broader alternative tax base (taxable income plus 
the 60% capital gains exclusion) will exceed the regular tax and the 
penalty commences. While additional deductions will continue to re-
duce the alternative tax base until the amount of itemized deductions 
becomes so large as to become "adjusted," those deductions now re-
duce the alternative tax with its lower marginal rates rather than the 
regular tax. 
Accordingly, once the alternative tax becomes applicable, the tax 
benefit from deductions becomes a function of the 25% or lower alter-
native tax rates rather than the regular tax rate. The penalty then of 
41. That is not to say that an alternative tax so designed would be appropriate. The view 
expressed herein is that the very concept of an alternative tax is defective. Moreover, the propriety 
of penalizing capital gains as a function of the level of unrelated deductions is highly dubious. 
See note 9 supra. 
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becoming subject to the alternative tax is that a portion of the tax bene-
fit otherwise attributable to the claiming of deductions is withdrawn. 
The amount of the tax benefit lost will equal the excess of the tax-
payer's regular tax rate over the applicable alternative tax rate. This 
amount will vary, however, in an unfair manner. 
The inequity of the alternative tax's consequences can be shown 
with an illustration. The following is the computation of the regular 
and alternative tax for a married individual with three additional de-
pendents, no business or other deductions applicable in computing ad-
justed gross income, and no tax credits: 
REGULAR TAX ALTERNATIVE TAX 
A B A B 
Ordinary Income $ 50,000 Net Amount $ 46,000 -I 
Capital Gains 125,000 60% of Gains 75,000 
40% of Gains 50,000 AMTI 121,000 
-I 
AGI 100,000 Tax 17,250 - .25 
Personal Exemptions 4,000 Marginal Rate 25% 
Itemized Deductions 50,000 +I 
Net Amount 46,000 -I 
ZBA 3,400 
Taxable Income 49,400 -I 
Tax 14,484 - .49 
Marginal Rate 49% 
Columns B demonstrate the effect of claiming an additional item-
ized deduction of one dollar (although the result would be the same for 
business deductions). In the absence of the alternative tax, the taxpayer 
would have reduced his tax burden under the regular tax by forty-nine 
cents. However, because he is subject to the alternative tax, he will 
reduce his tax burden by only twenty-five cents. Accordingly, the addi-
tional alternative tax penalty incurred is equal to the difference be-
tween the tax benefit that the taxpayer would have received from the 
deduction in the absence of the alternative tax and the tax benefit that 
he in fact received, or twenty-four cents. 
As can be seen, the size of the penalty incurred varies with the 
marginal bracket rate of the regular tax otherwise payable. The higher 
the taxpayer's regular marginal rate, the greater becomes the penalty 
imposed. For example, a taxpayer having the same proportion of ordi-
nary income and capital gains as illustrated above, but in triple the 
amounts, would also be subject to the alternative tax penalty. How-
ever, he would be in a regular tax bracket of 64% and thus would incur 
a penalty of thirty-nine cents for each additional dollar of itemized de-
1980] ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1105 
ductions claimed, rather than twenty-four cents.42 
It is, of course, always true that the loss of a deduction "costs" an 
upper bracket taxpayer more than the same loss costs a lower bracket 
taxpayer. The loss of a deduction produces the same consequence as 
the receipt of additional income, which, of course, produces a greater 
tax to an upper bracket taxpayer than to a lower bracket taxpayer. The 
alternative tax, however, imposes a relative burden on upper bracket 
taxpayers that is far more severe than this normal effect of the disallow-
ance of a deduction. 
The excessive penalty on higher bracket taxpayers can be quanti-
fied by comparing the effect under the alternative tax of an additional 
itemized deduction on taxpayers in different marginal brackets with the 
effect of a provision uniformly disallowing 50% of claimed deductions 
attributable to specified preferences. Under such a proportional provi-
sion, taxpayers at all income levels would be treated as if their taxable 
incomes had declined by only one-half of the decline that would be 
recognized in the absence of any disallowance provision. If, for exam-
ple, a taxpayer incurred a disallowable expenditure in the amount of 
$10,000, he would be treated as if he had incurred an expenditure of 
only $5,000--regardless of his income level. Thus, all taxpayers would 
be treated equally under such a provision. The after-tax effect of that 
disallowance, of course, would vary as a function of the taxpayer's mar-
ginal bracket. For a taxpayer in the 49% bracket, a $10,000 deduction 
will reduce his tax liability by $4,900. A 50% disallowance of that de-
duction would reduce the tax benefit attributable to the deduction from 
$4,900 to one-half that amount, or $2,450. The same disallowance for a 
taxpayer in the 64% bracket would reduce the tax benefit from the de-
duction from $6,400 to $3,200. All taxpayers would lose an equal pro-
portion of the tax benefit from making the disallowable expenditures-
one-half. 
Under the alternative tax, the tax benefit from incurring a $10,000 
expenditure is reduced to $2,500, assuming that the maximum alterna-
tive tax bracket is applicable, regardless of the taxpayer's regular tax 
bracket or the tax benefit that would have been obtained in the absence 
of the alternative tax. For a taxpayer in the 49% bracket, the tax benefit 
is reduced from $4,900 to $2,500. Accordingly, such a taxpayer is 
treated as if he had made an expenditure equal to 25/49ths of$10,000, 
or $5,102.43 However, a taxpayer in the 64% bracket is treated as if he 
had made an expenditure of only 25/64ths of $10,000, or $3,910. The 
42. That is, the expenditure would reduce his alternative tax by 25 cents, rather than his 
regular tax by 64 cents. The penalty, or loss of tax benefit, is 39 cents. 
43. Viewed conversely, at the 49% bracket, a deduction of $5,102 produces a tax benefit of 
$2,500. 
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taxpayers are not treated equally; rather, a disproportionately large 
penalty is imposed upon the higher bracket taxpayer. Stated differ-
ently, under the alternative tax, a taxpayer in the 49% bracket will lose 
49% of the tax benefit of his deductions, while a taxpayer in the 64% 
bracket will lose 61% of the benefit of his deductions. 
The disproportionate penalty imposed on higher bracket taxpayers 
by the alternative tax is particularly objectionable since the greater 
penalty is imposed not because of any greater abuse by the taxpayer, 
but rather because of a higher level of unsheltered income. Indeed, 
these relative penalties are always imposed if the alternative tax is ap-
plicable and wholly without regard to either the absolute amount of 
gains that are sheltered or to the proportion of the gain that is shel-
tered. Thus, the relatively more severe penalty imposed upon our hy-
pothetical 64% bracket taxpayer is applicable even though the amount 
of capital gains that he sheltered from tax was smaller than the amount 
sheltered by the 49% bracket taxpayer and, of necessity, represented a 
far smaller portion of his entire capital gain. 
Moreover, if the purpose of the alternative tax is to penalize the 
offsetting of capital gains with ordinary deductions,44 not only is the tax 
not progressive with respect to the magnitude of the abuse, but the in-
cremental penalty imposed actually declines as a taxpayer shelters in-
creasing amounts of capital gains. At a fixed level of income, as the 
amount of ordinary deductions claimed by the taxpayer increases, his 
taxable income and thus his marginal rate of tax decreases. Accord-
ingly, the difference between the taxpayer's regular tax rate and his al-
ternative tax rate will be reduced and the effective penalty imposed by 
the alternative tax will decline.45 Thus, if our hypothetical 64% bracket 
taxpayer claimed sufficient deductions to reduce his taxable income to 
$49,400, he would now be in the 49% bracket and would lose only 49% 
of the benefit of his further deductions.46 
In this respect, the alternative tax cannot be judged rational. The 
sheltering of equal dollar amounts of capital gains at different levels of 
unsheltered income should be subject either to the same penalty47 or, as 
unsheltered income rises, a lesser penalty because the proportion of the 
44. This effect and presumed purpose of the alternative tax is, of course, subject to the im-
precision discussed above. C.f. subsection II(A)(2) supra (extent of congressional awareness of 
impacts uncertain). Over a broad range of intermediate gains, some alternative tax will be paya-
ble even though no capital gains are offset. 
45. If the deductions become so large as to become "adjusted," the alternative tax will no 
longer decline. See text accompanying notes 53-55 i'!fra. A decline in the tax benefit from adding 
deductions sufficient to put a taxpayer in a lower tax bracket is, of course, a feature of the regular 
income tax. That tax, however, was not designed to penalize the claiming of itemized deductions. 
46. See text following note 43 supra. 
47. The tax would have been rational if, in this circumstance, either the same dollar amount 
of penalty were imposed or the same correction of taxable income occurred as under the propor-
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entire gain that has been sheltered would have declined. Under the 
alternative tax, however, the incidence of the tax is just the reverse.48 
The irrationality of this aspect of the alternative tax is directly at-
tributable to the use of a separate system of taxation. Indeed, the ef-
fects described above are inherent in the use of an alternative tax and 
could not be eliminated even by making the rate structure of the alter-
native tax parallel the regular income tax rate structure. For example, 
if the alternative tax rate applicable to a taxpayer in the 64% bracket 
were 33%, the taxpayer would retain a tax benefit from his deductions 
equal to 33/64ths or approximately 51% of the expenditure, and thus 
would be treated the same as the 49% bracket taxpayer described 
above. Each would lose an equal proportion of the tax benefit from a 
given expenditure.49 However, in this instance, that modification alone 
would not suffice to make the alternative tax equitable. Because the 
alternative tax base consists of elements that are not present in the reg-
ular tax base, the alternative base will vary independently of the regu-
lar base. As long as the rate to be applied is a function of the size of the 
alternative tax base, there is no method for ensuring that a taxpayer in 
a regular tax bracket of 64% would be subject to an alternative tax rate 
of 33% while a taxpayer in a regular bracket of 49% would be subject to 
an alternative rate of 25%. In order to ensure that result, the alternative 
tax rate would have to be related to the taxpayer's regular tax rate, 
rather than to the size of his alternative tax base. 
The effect of these improvements to the alternative tax, of course, 
would be to reduce the differences between these two taxes and to cause 
the alternative tax to resemble more nearly a modification of the com-
putation of taxable income. If it is understood that the use of a rate 
schedule unrelated to the regular schedule produces inequitable results, 
it follows that the proper approach to restricting the use of tax prefer-
ences lies solely in making adjustments to the tax base, and not in cre-
ating a separate alternative tax. And further, if it is merely the tax base 
that is to be adjusted, little, if any, purpose is served by defining an 
entirely independent base rather than modifying the existing computa-
tiona! disallowance described in the text. Under the latter form, the dollar amount of penalty 
would vary with the taxpayer's marginal rate of tax. 
48. This discriminatory featnre of the alternative tax does not constitute a mere increase in 
the progression of the regular taxing system. On the contrary, had onr hypothetical taxpayer 
derived more income, rather than sustained a greater expense, the added income would have been 
subject to the far lower alternative rate of tax (25%) until the point was reached that the regular 
tax exceeded the alternative tax. For a criticism of this aspect of the tax, see notes 62-64 and 
accompanying text i'!(ra. 
49. This observation further illustrates the point made earlier that the alternative tax cannot 
be made equitable unless its rate structure exactly parallels that of the regular tax. See generally 
subsection II(A)(3) supra. 
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tion of taxable income in a manner similar to the rejected 1969 House 
proposal. 
Indeed, the most disturbing aspect of the alternative tax is the ease 
with which Congress could have achieved its general objective through 
relatively simple adjustments to the existing computation of taxable in-
come. A reduction in the tax benefit attributable to deductions used to 
offset capital gains could have been achieved simply by requiring all 
deductions in excess of ordinary income plus, for example, $20,000 to 
be treated as capital losses to the extent of any capital gains. 5° Not only 
was it totally unnecessary to introduce the complexity of the alternative 
tax, but such an adjustment to taxable income would have produced a 
rational pattern of disallowance and would thus have had a far more 
equitable impact. The amount of the penalty imposed under such a 
provision would be uniform with respect to taxpayers at different levels 
of taxable income. Further, such a provision would eliminate the im-
precision of the alternative tax. By directly adjusting taxable income, 
no class of taxpayers would become subject to a penalty unless deduc-
tions in fact exceeded ordinary income. Congress could have achieved 
its objective more simply and fairly by altering the existing taxing sys-
tem rather than creating a new level of taxation. 5 1 
C Adjusted Itemized Deductions 
The adjusted itemized deductions provisions of the alternative tax 
serve only to prevent a taxpayer from reducing through itemized de-
ductions his taxable income below a presumably acceptable fraction of 
his adjusted gross income. As a mechanism for achieving this goal, 
however, the alternative tax is unduly circuitous and cumbersome. 
Congress could have achieved the same results far more simply by al-
tering the definition of taxable income. 52 
The alternative tax base in the presence of adjusted itemized de-
ductions is classical taxable income plus the entire amount of the tax-
payer's itemized deductions in excess of 60% of adjusted gross income 
(reduced by the four favored deductions).53 The effect of this restora-
50. A somewhat similar approach applies in the disallowance of a portion of the deduction 
for investment interest expense. I.R.C. § 163(d). 
51. The statements in the text should not be read as implying approval of treating itemized 
deductions as capital losses but only as suggesting that, if limits on the tax benefit of certain 
deductions are to be imposed, there are more rational methods than the alternative tax. See note 9 
supra. 
52. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the propriety of treating itemized deduc-
tions in excess of an arbitrarily defined level as a preference. Quite clearly, however, the definition 
of adjusted itemized deductions is a highly inexact approximation of the preferential component 
of such deductions. 
53. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(I)(C)(i), 57(b)(l). 
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tion of income is that the taxpayer may not reduce his alternative tax 
base below 40% of his adjusted gross income as modified. That is, once 
deductions reach this level, while the taxable income component of the 
alternative tax base continues to be reduced by one dollar for each dol-
lar of deduction claimed, the base is simultaneously increased by the 
one dollar larger adjusted itemized deduction. Consequently, if a tax-
payer has adjusted itemized deductions but no capital gains, his alter-
native tax base will always equal 40% of his adjusted gross income less 
the favored deductions, all reduced by his personal exemptions.54 
This absolute bar against the claiming of deductions in excess of a 
specified fraction of income is also reminiscent of the limitation on the 
claiming of tax preference benefits included in the 1969 House propo-
sal. Unlike that bill, however, the alternative tax subjects a taxpayer to 
the much lower alternative tax rate schedule for the irreducible- level of 
income rather than to the regular income tax. Furthermore, because an 
alternative tax does not actually become payable until that tax exceeds 
the regular income tax, a taxpayer can continue to reduce his taxable 
income to a level substantially below 40% of adjusted gross income 
before becoming subject to any penalty. Because an alternative tax can 
be computed under the formula set forth above for any level of ad-
justed gross income less the favored deductions for a taxpayer having 
adjusted itemized deductions, it is possible to determine the extent to 
which regular taxable income may be depressed by itemized deductions 
before the alternative tax becomes applicable.55 At that point, of 
course, the taxpayer cannot further reduce his tax liability by claiming 
itemized deductions because itemized deductions have no effect on the 
alternative tax base. Accordingly, the general effect of the inclusion of 
the adjusted itemized deductions preference is to absolutely prohibit 
the claiming of a tax benefit attributable to itemized deductions in ex-
54. This equivalence can be demonstrated algebraically. Absent capital gains, but in the 
presence of adjusted itemized deductions, alternative minimum taxable income (AMTJ) equals 
gross income ( Gl) less all deductions [including deductions (.D) in arriving at adjusted gross in-
come (AGJ), itemized deductions other than the favored deductions (/.D), the favored deductions 
(F.D), and the personal exemptions (PE)] plus the amount by which /.D exceeds 60% of AGI-F.D. 
Thus: 
AMTI = GI- .D- I.D- F.D- PE + I.D- .6(AGI- F.D) 
but AGI = GI- .D 
:. AMTI = AGI- I.D - F.D- PE + I.D- .6 (AGI- F.D) 
= AGI- F.D- .6AGI + .6F.D- PE 
= .4AGI- .4F.D - PE 
= .4 (AGI- F.D)- PE 
See Seago, supra note 40, at 236. 
55. In order to make this comparison of the two taxes, it is necessary to assign a value to the 
sum of the four favored deductions. For all computations herein, it has been assumed that this 
value equals 10% of adjusted gross income. 
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cess of a specified fraction of adjusted gross income. The fraction, 
however, is not 40%, but rather a much lower (and variable) number. 
Because of the relatively high exemption and low rate schedule of 
the alternative tax, the point at which an alternative tax will become 
payable is not reached until the taxpayer has sheltered almost all of his 
income. For example, a married taxpayer having an adjusted gross in-
come of $100,000, favored deductions of $10,000, and four personal 
exemptions cannot reduce his alternative tax below $1,200.56 His regu-
lar tax liability, assuming he had no tax credits, will not be depressed to 
that amount until the taxpayer has claimed itemized deductions of 
$78,633.57 Until that amount of deductions is claimed (and assuming 
no capital gains), the regular tax will always exceed the alternative tax. 
Accordingly, the taxpayer will be able to reduce his classical taxable 
income to $7,367, or 7.4% of his adjusted gross income, before becom-
ing subject to the alternative tax and thereby barred from obtaining 
any tax benefit from further itemized deductions. The alternative tax, 
then, permits this taxpayer to shelter up to 92.6% of his adjusted gross 
income with itemized deductions and personal exemptions. 
As adjusted gross income increases, the proportion of adjusted 
gross income that may be sheltered before the alternative tax becomes 
payable declines somewhat. Thus, of an adjusted gross income of 
$200,000, 87.7% may be sheltered without penalty, and of $500,000, 
84.5% may be sheltered. This progressive impact of the alternative tax 
is, of course, attributable to the progressivity of the alternative tax rate 
schedule. However, the effect of this progressivity is chiefly exper-
ienced on alternative taxable incomes of between $60,000 (when the 
20% rate bracket is reached) and approximately twice that amount. For 
the income configurations presently being considered, that level of al-
ternative taxable income roughly corresponds to adjusted gross in-
comes of between $178,000 and $344,000. 
The use of the complex mechanics of the alternative tax simply to 
bar the reduction of taxable income below a fraction, even a variable 
fraction, of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income through itemized de-
ductions is particularly odd since Congress was already familiar with 
the 1969 proposal to uniformly bar the deduction (or exclusion) of pref-
erences in excess of 50% of "economic" income. The incidence of the 
56. Under the formula in note 54 supra, 40% of $90,000 ($100,000 less $10,000) creates an 
AMTl of $36,000, from which personal exemptions of $4,000 are subtracted. The alternative tax 
on an AMTI of $32,000 is $1,200. Additional itemized deductions will have no effect on this final 
figure. 
57. AGI of $100,000 less favored deductions of $10,000, less itemized deductions of $78,633 
(of which $3,400 are not deductible because of the zero bracket amount provision), less $4,000 
produces a taxable income of$10,767, the regular tax on which is $1,200. Ignoring the zero brack· 
et amount, the classical taxable income of this taxpayer would be $7,367. 
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alternative tax is somewhat different from that of the 1969 bill because 
the proportion of income that can be sheltered under the alternative tax 
declines somewhat as adjusted gross income rises. However, a similar 
progression could easily be achieved under the older approach by the 
simple addition of a fixed dollar exemption. Deductions in excess of 
80% of adjusted gross income plus $5,000, for example, could be the 
amount restored to income. Thus, of an adjusted gross income of 
$100,000 with four personal exemptions, a taxpayer could shelter 89% 
($80,000 + $5,000 + $4,000) with itemized deductions, but of an ad-
justed gross income of $500,000, only 81.8% ($400,000 + $5,000 + 
$4,000) could be sheltered. In sum, the alternative tax is totally unnec-
essary and a better result_could be achieved by a modification of taxa-
ble income.58 
.D. The Combined Effect of Both Preferences 
Analysis of the alternative tax when only one preference item is 
present suggests that the tax is neither necessary in principle nor prop-
erly constructed in practice. If there is any redeeming merit to the tax it 
must come from some uniquely appropriate pattern of taxation that 
emerges when both items of preference are present. No such advantage 
of the alternative tax exists, however. Except for the relatively minor 
consequences of the progressive rate structure of the alternative tax, the 
penalty imposed when both preferences are present is merely the sum 
of the penalties that would be imposed on the separate preferences. 
When both preferences are present, the alternative tax base will 
equal40% of adjusted gross income less the favored deductions, all less 
the personal exemptions, and increased by 60% of capital gains. This is 
simply the formula for computing the alternative tax base in the pres-
ence of adjusted itemized deductions increased by the amount of the 
untaxed capital gain. It initially might appear that the effect of the 
58. If an alternative tax liability is incurred by a taxpayer because of adjusted itemized de-
ductions, tl!e penalty is not limited to the claiming of those deductions. While the alternative tax 
migl!t appear to exempt the claiming of favored deductions, in fact those deductions are penalized 
almost as heavily as are all other itemized deductions. In this circumstance the alternative tax 
base will equal 40% of adjusted gross income less the favored deductions, all reduced by the 
personal exemptions. See note 54 supra. Thus, incurring one additional dollar of a favored de-
duction will reduce the alternative tax base by only 40 cents. Since the maximum alternative tax 
rate is 25%, the maximum tax benefit that can be obtained from a favored deduction under the 
alternative tax is 10% (40% of 25%) of the amount of an expenditure. For example, a taxpayer 
having an adjusted gross income of $200,000 and total deductions (and personal exemptions) of 
$171,900 will have a taxable income of $31,500. While his regular tax marginal bracket rate 
would be 37%, in fact he would be subject to the alternative tax at the 20% rate. If the taxpayer 
claims an additional medical expense deduction of one dollar, he will reduce his alternative tax 
liability by only 8 cents ($I x 40% x 20%). Since the tax benefit that he would have obtained under 
the regular tax would have been 37 cents, the alternative tax has withdrawn nearly 80% of the tax 
benefit attributable to this "favored" deduction. 
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resulting alternative tax would be to prevent the reduction of taxable 
income below some fraction of the sum of adjusted gross income59 plus 
the untaxed capital gains, such fraction varying only with income. 
Such income variance would thus resemble the case of the taxpayer 
having adjusted itemized deductions but no capital gains. The effect of 
having both preferences, however, is not that simple. 
The alternative tax does not reduce adjusted itemized deductions 
and capital gains to fungible commodities in the same manner that the 
regular income tax reduces income from various sources to equivalent 
values that may be added to produce the tax base. Rather, the prefer-
ences have quite different impacts and, as a result, a given level of ad-
justed gross income plus untaxed capital gains can produce a wide 
range of alternative taxes depending upon the mix of ordinary income 
and capital gains.60 
The effect of the alternative tax when both preferences are present 
can best be understood by tracing the effect of claiming increasing 
amounts of itemized deductions by a taxpayer having substantial capi-
tal gains. As seen above,61 as the itemized deductions begin to exceed 
the taxpayer's ordinary income and shelter the capital gains from tax, 
the taxpayer will begin to incur an alternative tax penalty. The penalty 
incurred is the partial loss of the tax benefit from the itemized deduc-
tions. Additional deductions will result in not only a reduction of the 
alternative tax liability, but also a widening of the gap between the 
alternative tax and the regular tax and thus an increase in the penalty. 
When the amount of itemized deductions becomes so large as to be-
come adjusted, the alternative tax base will become fixed. If the tax-
payer had no capital gains, he would still not be subject to an 
alternative tax penalty. Even though the alternative tax base was fixed 
at 40% of adjusted gross income (less the favored deductions), the regu-
lar tax would continue to exceed the alternative tax until the itemized 
deductions offset approximately 90% of adjusted gross income. How-
ever, since the alternative tax already exceeds the regular tax because of 
the penalty attributable to the capital gain, the taxpayer may not fur-
ther reduce his tax liability with itemized deductions. 
59. Less the favored deductions and personal exemptions. 
60. For example, a taxpayer having adjusted itemized deductions and a capital gain of 
$50,000 and an AGI of$170,000 will have a total of AGI plus untaxed capital gains of$200,000. 
If the taxpayer has favored deductions of $17,000 and four personal exemptions, his alternative 
tax base will be $87,200, or 43.6% of AGI plus untaxed gains. However, were the capital gain 
$150,000, AGI $110,000, and favored deductions $11,000, the total of AGl plus untaxed gains 
would still equal $200,000 but the resulting alternative tax base would be $125,600 or 62.8% of 
$200,000. As appears from the foregoing illustration, the penalty imposed with respect to capital 
gains is far more severe than is the penalty imposed with respect to adjusted itemized deductions. 
61. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
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The level of income at which this point is reached is dependent 
upon the proportion of the income that consists of capital gains. If the 
gains are very small, the alternative tax will, of course, approach the 
tax imposed with respect to adjusted itemized deductions alone. As the 
proportion of capital gains increases, the alternative tax is progressively 
increased by the penalty attributable to the capital gain. 
Thus, the alternative tax in the presence of both preferences is 
nothing more or less than the sum of the taxes that would be imposed 
independently, slightly increased by the progressivity of the alternative 
tax rates. The equitable impact of the alternative tax is not improved 
in the least when the tax is applied to both preferences. 
In fact, when both preferences are present, the alternative tax cre-
ates a distorted pattern of taxation that penalizes capital gains far more 
harshly than Congress probably intended. Whenever a taxpayer has 
more expenses than he is entitled to deduct fully because of a limitation 
related to income, the addition of income will not produce a tax at the 
taxpayer's normal tax rates. Under a provision similar to the 50% ceil-
ing proposed in 1969, for example, the addition of one dollar of ordi-
nary income would permit the deduction of an additional fifty cents 
attributable to the preference. Thus, if the restriction were applicable 
to a taxpayer, his receipt of additional ordinary income would, in effect, 
be subject to tax at only one-half of his normal rate. Under the alterna-
tive tax, the lower marginal rate on added income is partly the indirect 
consequence of becoming entitled to additional deductions and partly 
the direct consequence of the lower alternative tax rate structure. 
The alternative tax base, it will be recalled, generally comprises 
the sum of (a) gross income less all deductions, (b) the untaxed 60% of 
capital gains, and (c) the amount of itemized deductions in excess of 
60% of adjusted gross income less the favored deductions. The alterna-
tive tax schedule consists of four tax brackets ranging in rate from 10% 
to 25%. If a taxpayer is subject to the alternative tax but does not have 
adjusted itemized deductions, additional income will be subject to tax 
at the same rate, a maximum of 25%, regardless of whether it consti-
tutes ordinary income or capital gains. Because of the addition of the 
untaxed portion of capital gains to the alternative tax base, both classes 
of income are fully subject to tax at the alternative tax rate.62 If the 
taxpayer has adjusted itemized deductions, however, the marginal rate 
of tax applicable to capital gains will be greater than the marginal rate 
62. The only preference that remains for capital gains under the alternative tax is that the 
taxpayer is able to derive substantially larger amounts of capital gains income before arriving at 
the point at which the regular tax will again exceed the alternative tax. The addition of ordinary 
income, of course, will cause the regular tax to increase more rapidly than will the addition of 
capital gains. 
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applicable to ordinary income.63 The receipt of an additional dollar of 
ordinary income would increase a taxpayer's alternative tax base by 
only forty cents-the income would be added in full to the tax base but 
at the same time would permit the deduction of an additional sixty 
cents of itemized deduction. As a result, the effective marginal tax rate 
becomes only 40% of the alternative tax rate of 25%, or I 0%. An addi-
tional dollar of capital gain, on the other hand, will cause a one dollar 
increase in the alternative tax base (a forty cent increase in classical 
taxable income plus sixty cents untaxed capital gains preference). The 
gain will increase adjusteq, gross income by forty cents, thus permitting 
the taxpayer to deduct an additional amount of itemized deductions 
equal to 60% of that forty cent increase, or twenty-four cents. Thus, the 
net increase in the alternative tax base will be seventy-six cents (one 
dollar total increase minus twenty-four cents itemized deduction now 
allowable) if the added income is a capital gain rather than the forty 
cent increase that would occur if the income were ordinary.64 Accord-
63. This somewhat surprising result can be illustrated by tracing the effect of independently 
adding one dollar of ordinary income and one dollar of capital gains to the computation of a 
taxpayer's alternative tax liability. 
Ordinary Income Capital Gain 
Ordinary Income $ 128,000 +I 
Capital Gain 180,000 +I 
40% of Gain 72,000 + .40 
AGI 200,000 +I + .40 
Itemized Deductions* (130,000) 
Favored Deductions (10,000) 
Personal Exemptions (4,000) 
Net Amount 56,000 +I + .40 
60% of Gain 108,000 + .60 
Itemized Deductions* 130,000 
Less: AGI $200,000 +I + .40 
Favored Deductions 10,000 
190,000 +I + .40 
60% of [AGI - Favored Deductions] (114,000) (+ .60) (+ .24) 
AID 16,000 
- .60 - .24 
AMTI 180,000 + .40 + .76 
Alternative Tax (Maximum Rate) 32,000 + .10 + .19 
• Other Than Favored 
64. This distortion occurs because the alternative tax simultaneously attacks both the offset-
ting of capital gains and the taking of excessive ordinary deductions. If the alternative tax did not 
require increasing the tax base by the amount of untaxed capital gains, the addition of one dollar 
of capital gains would increase the tax base by 40 cents while continuing to permit the additional 
deduction of 24 cents of itemized deductions. Thus, the net increase in the alternative tax base 
would be 16 cents, or 40% of the increase that would occur if the additional income were ordinary, 
and the relationship between these two classes of income would be preserved. 
1980] ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1115 
ingly, the maximum effective alternative tax rate applicable to an addi-
tional dollar of capital gains is 25% of76%, or 19%, rather than the 10% 
that is applicable to ordinary income. 
While the alternative tax was designed to penalize the sheltering of 
the taxable portion of capital gains with ordinary deductions, that ob-
jective does not justify imposing a higher rate of tax on capital gains 
than on ordinary income. Moreover, since the more general objective 
in adopting the alternative tax was to reduce the rate of tax to which 
capital gains were subject, it seems most unlikely that this result of the 
alternative tax was intended by Congress. 
E. Credits 
Although the alternative tax was designed to address the abuse of 
the capital gains exclusion and the excessive claiming of itemized de-
ductions, the tax's effect on credits is often greater than that on itemized 
deductions. This exaggerated effect, naturally, is coupled with much 
complexity. 
For the purpose of the alternative tax, the increasing number of 
tax credits are divided into four categories. The first category includes 
those credits that were left unimpaired by,.the new tax: the two credits 
that in effect discharge obligation~ of the United States to the taxpayer 
(the section 31 credit for withheld taxes and the section 39 credit for 
certain excise taxes) and the section 43 earned income credit, in effect a 
part of the rate structure. These three credits are disregarded in com-
puting regular tax liability for purposes of comparison with alternative 
tax liability. 65 The general effect of this comparison is to permit the full 
amount of the credits to offset the alternative tax liability. 
A similarly protective approach is adopted toward the foreign tax 
credit, analytically separable as a second category because of its com-
plex modification before being offset against the alternative tax.66 
The credits comprising the remaining two categories may not be 
offset against the alternative tax.67 As a result, a taxpayer subject to the 
alternative tax will obtain no current tax benefit at all from most cred-
its. For example, assume that a taxpayer has an alternative tax liability 
precisely equal to his regular tax liability so that no penalty is incurred. 
If he then makes an expenditure for which a section 44A child care 
credit is allowable, his regular tax will be reduced by the amount of the 
credit but his alternative tax liability will be unaffected. As a result, a 
65. I.R.C. § SS(b)(2). 
66. I.R.C. § 55(c)(2). In general, a taxpayer is permitted to apply foreign tax credits against 
his regular tax, excluding the preference tax, enlarged by his alternative tax. The § 904 limitation 
is modified to become the ratio of the taxpayer's foreign source AMTI to his entire AMTI. 
67. I.R.C. § SS(c)(l). 
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penalty equal to the full amount of the credit will be imposed, and he 
will have entirely lost the tax benefit of that expenditure. 
This extreme harshness of the alternative tax is substantially ame-
liorated for certain favored credits for which carryovers of unused cred-
its are permitted. 68 The entire amount of any such credits that do not 
provide a tax benefit in the current year because of the application of 
the alternative tax may be carried over and credited in another year.69 
Thus, the alternative tax merely requires the deferral of a tax benefit 
from these three credits rather than its complete elimination. The net 
penalty thereby imposed is merely the cost of the loss of the use of the 
amount of the credit for the relevant period of time. 70 Accordingly, the 
-alternative tax penalty on these credits will generally be far less than 
the penalty upon itemized deductions. 
In contrast to credits which cannot be carried over, a taxpayer will 
always obtain some tax benefit from the claiming of itemized deduc-
tions under the alternative tax until their aggregate amount exceeds 
60% of adjusted gross income (less the favored deductions), that is, be-
comes "adjusted." Since this tolerance is lacking in the case of these 
credits, the effect of the alternative tax on credits will frequently be far 
more severe than its effect on the deductions that apparently were the 
primary target of the tax. 
The effect of the alternative tax upon credits is in fact similar to 
the effect of the tax on the claiming of itemized deductions once the 
taxpayer has adjusted itemized deductions. In that event, a taxpayer in 
effect cannot redm:e his classical taxable income below a percentage of 
adjusted gross income which ranges from 7% to 15%.71 The point at 
which the taxpayer will entirely lose the benefit of a credit, however, is 
68. I.R.C. § 55(c)(3). As the alternative tax was originally enacted, the favored credits in· 
eluded only the § 44B new jobs credit, the§ 40 work incentive program credit, and the§ 38 invest· 
ment tax credit. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 42l(a), 92 Stat. 2763. One year later, 
however, this list of favored credits was expanded by the addition of two credits relating to energy 
conservation, one of the policies currently most popular in Congress: the existing § 44C residen· 
tial energy credit, Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 104(a)(4)(G), 94 Stat. 
194 (1980), and the newly added§ 44E alcohol fuel credit, Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, §§ 232(b)(l), 232(b)(2), 94 Stat. 229. 
69. I.R.C. § 55(c)(3). 
70. The amount of the penalty imposed on these credits will vary from none to the complete 
elimination of any tax benefit. In many cases, no penalty at all will be incurred because the 
unused credit will merely be carried back and claimed for a prior year. At the other extreme, if 
the alternative tax caused the deferral of a carried-over credit from a previous year that would 
expire in the year in which the alternative tax was imposed, the effect would be to eliminate 
completely the tax benefit from the credit. Between these extremes, the effect of the tax is to 
accelerate the payment of tax. Thus, the cost to the taxpayer will be a function of his cost of 
borrowing and the number of years that the credit is deferred. 
71. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. 
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at higher percentages of adjusted gross income over all levels of in-
come. 
This harsher treatment of credits can be illustrated by comparing 
the effect of the alternative tax on adjusted itemized deductions with 
its effect on the extreme case of a taxpayer having no itemized deduc-
tions at all but sheltering his income with credits. In connection with 
the analysis of adjusted itemized deductions, we hypothesized an indi-
vidual having adjusted gross income of$100,000, favored deductions of 
$10,000, and four personal exemptions. This taxpayer could claim 
itemized deductions of up to $78,633. His taxable income would be 
$10,767 (classical taxable income of $7,367 plus the non-deductible 
$3,400 zero bracket amount) and his tax would be $1,200. Because his 
alternative tax base of $7,367 plus adjusted itemized deductions of 
$24,633, or $32,000, would also produce a tax of $1,200, the taxpayer 
would not be subject to the alternative tax. 
Had the taxpayer claimed no itemized deductions other than the 
favored deductions, but rather made expenditures producing tax cred-
its, his alternative tax base would consist of his classical taxable income 
of $86,000 and his alternative tax would be $9,200. Since that tax lia-
bility cannot be affected by the claiming of credits, the taxpayer could 
obtain the tax benefit of credits only until his regular tax were reduced 
to $9,200 and any further credits would be permanently lost. A regular 
tax of $9,200 is payable on a taxable income of $37,614. Thus, while 
the taxpayer would be entitled to reduce his adjusted gross income 
through deductions by 92.6%, in effect he could reduce it through cred-
its by only 62.4%. 
A similar relationship prevails at all income levels. A taxpayer 
having adjusted gross income of $50,000 cannot be subject to an alter-
native tax by virtue of itemized deductions even if he could completely 
eliminate his regular tax. However, he could not reduce his tax below 
$2,100 through tax credits. At an adjusted gross income of$500,000, a 
taxpayer can reduce his taxable income with itemized deductions to 
$80,967, producing a tax of $31,000 before incurring an alternative tax 
liability that cannot be further reduced. However, he cannot reduce his 
tax below $98,500 with credits, the equivalent of a taxable income of 
$187,453, without incurring an alternative tax. 
In the example set forth above, an alternative tax liability was in-
curred even though the taxpayer did not have any capital gains or ad-
justed itemized deductions. Accordingly, and perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, one effect of the alternative tax is to impose a penalty 
solely upon the claiming of tax credits. There is no indication in the 
legislative history to the alternative tax that such a penalty was in-
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tended.72 
This result may have been an unavoidable side-effect. Neverthe-
less, the treatment of tax credits as preferences and restricting the 
amount of such preferences that may be claimed would be entirely ap-
propriate in a properly conceived attack on preferences, since credits 
generally are purely policy-executing provisions unrelated to the equi-
table computation of the burden of taxation. However, because of the 
quite different ways in which deductions and credits affect the compu-
tation of taxable income, it may well be that no single form of penalty 
can be fashioned that would appropriately limit both forms of al-
lowances. The 1969 ceiling on preferences, for example, would not 
have affected the claiming of credits at all. That provision, however, 
could quite easily have been supplemented with a limitation on the 
proportion of the tax that could be offset by all, or a specified group, of 
credits.73 
Ill 
A NoTE ON COMPLEXITY 
In spite of the increased concern that has been expressed in recent 
years over the complexity of the tax laws, the Code has continued to 
become more complex. Much of that complexity is amply justified by 
the inherent complexity of the subject matter addressed. It seems un-
likely, for example, that the tax avoidance potential of generation-skip-
ping trusts could equitably have been addressed by a provision much 
simpler than the present chapter thirteen of the Code.74 Similarly, the 
72. See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 39, at 122-24; 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, 
at 200-07. With the debatable exception of the§ 44A child care credit, tax credits are purely tax 
incentive provisions wholly unrelated to the equitable computation of taxable income. Accord-
ingly, there can be no objection on equitable grounds to the reduction or elimination of such a 
credit, or to a greater reduction in one credit than in another, as long as the reduction itself is 
effected in a manner that does not unjustly favor one class of taxpayers. On the other hand, many 
of the itemized deductions that are penalized by the alternative tax, such as those provided by 
§ 212, are not merely policy-executing provisions but rather are integral to the equitable computa· 
tion of taxable income. It might be questioned whether any limitation of the tax benefit attributa· 
ble to such allowances is appropriate. Regardless of the resolution of that doubt, however, it 
would seem clearly inappropriate to penalize nonpreferential, equitably required deductions more 
heavily than purely preferential, policy-executing credits. Yet, the alternative tax does precisely 
that in providing more favorable treatment to the employment and investment enhancing credits 
(which can be carried over) than to deductions necessary to the integrity of the computation of 
taxable income. 
73. One further side-effect of the adoption of the alternative tax deserves note. The removal 
of these preferences from the existing minimum tax quite commonly will reduce the impact of the 
preference tax on the remaining preference items. The exemption that previously might have 
been exhausted by the capital gains preference will not be available to shelter the remaining pref-
erences. Thus, the deletion of these two preference items has not only reduced the penalty appli· 
cable to those items, but has substantially reduced the penalty applicable to all preferences. 
74. l.R.C. §§ 2601-2622. 
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hard fought political compromise that produced the windfall profits tax 
necessarily required complex statutory definition.75 On the other hand, 
the complexity of the alternative tax is quite unnecessary and therefore 
highly objectionable. 
The very existence of a duplicate income tax is an obvious source 
of complexity in the law. That complexity could be justified if the al-
ternative tax were a clearly superior approach to restricting the exces-
sive concentration of tax preferences. This Article has undertaken to 
demonstrate, however, that results comparable to those obtained under 
the alternative tax could have been obtained far more simply by di-
rectly amending the computation of taxable income. Moreover, the 
simpler proposals made in past years could have been adapted to pro-
duce results far more equitable than those reached by the alternative 
tax. 
Not only is the existence of the alternative tax an unnecessary 
source of complexity in the law, but the manner in which the tax oper-
ates is also needlessly complex. Under the alternative tax, deductions 
and credits are divided into seven different categories producing a mul-
titude of different limitations that range from the slight to the severe on 
the tax benefits of these allowances. It seems improbable that any ob- 1 
jective of the alternative tax requires such a complex mosaic. 
This complex pattern of restrictions is particularly objectionable 
because the complexity was created solely for the purposes of the alter-
native tax. It may be assumed that Congress created these distinctions 
among tax allowances in an effort to improve the equitable impact of 
the new tax. But the differences in importance or preferential character 
among the various allowances is not nearly as great as are the differ-
ences in tax consequence among the several categories. Arguably, per-
haps, the policies underlying the credits for which carryovers are 
preserved are stronger than the policies underlying the remaining cred-
its. Yet it seems unlikely that the policies are so much stronger that one 
credit should be entirely disallowed if an alternative tax is payable, 
while another is merely postponed for a year or more. The arbitrari-
ness of this disproportionate impact of the alternative tax is aggravated 
by the process of assigning the various tax allowances to the several 
categories. Ranking the relative importance of the tax allowances that 
have been added to the law over time necessarily requires making diffi-
cult value judgments grounded in minimal factual bases. Certainly, 
many could dispute the rankings made by Congress in the alternative 
tax, and one amendment to that ranking has already occurred.76 Un-
75. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229. 
76. See note 68 supra. 
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fortunately, while the distinctions may be subtle and debatable, the tax 
consequences are considerable. 
Finally, at least some of the tax consequences seem highly inap-
propriate, if not arbitrary. It seems unlikely, for example, that Con-
gress affirmatively desired to eliminate all tax benefit from the claiming 
of certain tax credits if an alternative tax was payable, in view of the 
milder penalty imposed on all itemized deductions. Rather, one sus-
pects that Congress accepted that result because of an inability to deal 
more precisely with the effect of the tax on credits. As a result of all of 
these distinctions and their varying consequences, the resulting pattern 
of taxation appears almost random and certainly so arbitrary as not to 
be worth the complexity created.77 The distinctions drawn are far more 
likely to enrage a taxpayer seeking to understand the consequences of 
his transactions than to reassure him that the equity of the taxing sys-
tem is being furthered. 
CONCLUSION 
There was really no reason to expect the alternative tax to produce 
an equitable redress of the abuse of tax preferences. The measurement 
of two differently defined taxpaying capacities with two different yard-
sticks is hardly designed to produce comparable results. The roots of 
the alternative tax and its unsatisfactory impact unquestionably lie in 
the insistence by the Senate in 1969 that the concentration of tax prefer-
ence be addressed outside of the existing taxing system. In retrospect 
that decision seems clearly wrong. The impact of the preference tax 
was, and is, inequitable, and the alternative tax has greatly exaggerated 
those defects. 
This criticism is not intended to suggest that the resolution of the 
problem faced by Congress in 1969, and still present today, was easy or 
evident.78 That resolution requires identifying a relatively simple 
77. The alternative tax may also be undesirable because of its inflexibility. A change in the 
tax rate, for instance, has many conflicting consequences. It would reduce the proportion of AGI 
that could be sheltered with itemized deductions, which might be desirable. However, it would 
also produce a penalty, or a greater penalty, on unsheltered capital gains, which might not be 
desirable. Moreover, while the total penalty attributable to capital gains would be increased, the 
incremental penalty upon claiming additional deductions would actually be reduced, as the differ-
ence between the regular and alternative tax rates would be reduced. 
78. Indeed, there may not be any one form that is perfect. The LAL approach, see note 8 
supra, of limiting the claiming of preferences to the income from the activity in which the prefer· 
ence was claimed had several desirable features. Most significantly, this restriction would have 
affected ventures undertaken primarily for tax sheltering purposes far more heavily than ventures 
entered into for economie profit, and thus the attack was more focused upon the abuse. However, 
for the same reasons, the LAL might have favored established business at the expense of small or 
new business and thus might have been anticompetitive. Further, the LAL could have en-
couraged the restructuring of business activities to avoid its limitation. Not only is it undesirable 
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mechanism for curtailing the excessive use of preferences without too 
greatly undermining the incentives that those preferences were 
designed to create. 
Nevertheless, there cannot be any legitimate doubt that a serious 
effort to restore a measure of equity to the tax laws must begin by re-
storing a measure of integrity to the computation of taxable income. 
Since the excessive concentration of tax preferences results from the 
excessive reduction of taxable income through these preferences, the 
most logical avenue of redress is a direct limitation on the aggregate 
amount of preferences that any single taxpayer can claim. 
Unfortunately, two different approaches operating outside of the 
basic taxing system have now been tried. Neither is satisfactory. Per-
haps it is now apparent that to restrict equitably and rationally the ex-
cessive use of tax preferences, Congress should repeal these misguided 
efforts and reconsider more direct limitations on the amount of prefer-
ences that may be claimed. 
for the tax law to affect business organization, but those efforts undoubtedly would have precipi-
tated a complex set of rules defining separate activities. 
